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I. INTRODUCTION
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. the Supreme Court
enforced a mandatory arbitration clause in a securities registration
application and barred the employee from seeking relief in federal
court for his Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claim.'
Since the Court's decision compelling arbitration of an employee's
statutory claim, labor and employment lawyers have encouraged
employers to include binding arbitration clauses covering all potential
employer-employee claims in employment applications, handbooks,
and collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs").2 As one commentator
wrote after the Gilmer decision, "[t]he only thing remaining is for
employers to begin writing compulsory arbitration clauses into their
employment contracts."3
By inserting these clauses, many lawyers fail or refuse to rec-
ognize that the Supreme Court distinguished Gilmer from its earlier
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.4 In Gardner-Denver, the
Court allowed an employee to litigate his claim that the employer
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") in federal
court even though the union's CBA contained a mandatory arbitration
provision.5 The Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on three
issues,6 but lower courts appear to adhere only to the distinction
based on the context of the agreement. Courts since Gilmer have
tended to enforce arbitration clauses in individual employment
contracts but not provisions contained in CBAs.7 The Fourth Circuit
1. See 500 U.S. 20, 26-35 (1991).
2. Potential claims include statutory discrimination claims such as those under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the ADEA.
See Margaret A. Jacobs, Required Job-Bias Arbitration Stirs Critics, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994,
at B5; see also Andrew W. Volin, Recent Legal Developments in the Arbitration of Employment
Claims, DIsp. RESOL. J., Summer 1997, at 16, 17 (advising employers, in light of Gilmer, to
require binding arbitration for employee disputes).
3. R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and the
Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1864, 1912 (1994).
4. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
5. See id. at 49.
6. The Court in Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver on the basis that: (1) Gardner-
Denver did not address the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration clause but rather "the
quite different issue [of] whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent
judicial resolution of statutory claims;" (2) Gardner-Denver involved a mandatory arbitration
provision in a CBA; while in Gilmer, the clause was included in an individual employment
agreement; and (3) Gilmer, unlike Gardner-Denver, came under the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
7. See infra Part I.E. This distinction is quite relevant since approximately 14% of all
employees in the United States are now covered under CBAs. See Robert A. Ringler, Gilmer
and Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims in the Union Sector: Avoiding a
'Distinction Without a Difference", 47 LAB. L. J. 147, 148 (1996).
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in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,8 however,
eliminated this difference just five years after Gilmer. It held that
voluntary arbitration agreements are enforceable whether included in
an employment contract or a CBA.9 The Austin decision, though, has
not been widely adopted.'0
With the distinctions between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver are
dissolving and the legal precedent becoming increasingly uncertain,
employers and their lawyers will be unsure of the appropriate action
to take with respect to compulsory arbitration agreements." This
Note argues that employers should eliminate mandatory arbitration
clauses from preemployment agreements. This argument, however,
does not rely solely on legal precedent or predictions of the Supreme
Court's next decision. Instead, this Note focuses on the negative
effects of Austin found by lower courts when following Austin's
precedent, recent Congressional action, and public initiatives by
government organizations and private arbitration firms. This Note
also introduces the perspective of a strategic human resources
manager trying to determine the appropriate solution for employers.
This Note first analyzes the history of enforceability of manda-
tory arbitration clauses in employment agreements, examining the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Supreme Court history from
8. 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
9. See id.
10. See infra Part IV. The United States Supreme Court just granted certiorari in
March, 1998 to review a Fourth Circuit decision that compelled arbitration under a CBA. See
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869, at *1 (4th Cir. July
29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998). In Wright, the Fourth Circuit followed its prior
decision in Austin and held that a broad arbitration clause in a CBA does bind the employee to
arbitrate his ADA claim instead of seeking redress in federal court. See id. at *2.
11. The United States Supreme Court has also granted certiorari from a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The lower court, in Miller v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), held that a
nonunion employee was not required to exhaust federally mandated arbitration provided by the
union if he disputed the calculation of his agency fees. See id. at 1421. Under a prior Supreme
Court decision in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), unions
must offer an "impartial decisionmaker" to nonunion employees who wish to challenge the fee
they are required to pay under an agency shop agreement. See id. at 310. Miller actually puts
unions in the position to argue for mandatory arbitration. Under the union's argument, the law
requires it to provide arbitration, and if the law allows the nonunion employee to bring a claim
in court also, this would force the union to defend its agency fees in dual forums simultaneously.
Although Miller does not address a statutory claim and the arbitration is federally
mandated and not by voluntary agreement, the decision by the Miller Court could provide some
insight into its view of mandatory arbitration clauses. The court of appeals, in refusing to
compel arbitration, held that it saw "no legal basis for forcing into arbitration a party who never
agreed to put his dispute over federal law to such a process." Miller, 108 F.3d at 1421 (emphasis
omitted). If the Supreme Court follows this reasoning, arbitration agreements between unions
and employers in CBAs could not be enforced against individual employees, since the employee
himself never waived his statutory rights.
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Gardner-Denver to Gilmer, and decisions by lower courts since
Gilmer. Part III studies the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Austin and its
effect on cases decided by the few courts that have followed its
reasoning. Part IV suggests how the law should proceed as the
distinctions between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver begin to dissolve.
In this section, the Note argues that legislative history, public
rejection of mandatory arbitration agreements by government and
private organizations, and a strategic human resources management
perspective emphasize the need for voluntary agreements after the
dispute arises and not preemployment agreements. Finally, this Note
recommends that employers provide a grievance procedure that would
allow the employee to discuss any problems that arise with a higher-
ranking employee and, hopefully, resolve any conflict before incurring
the necessary expenses and time required by litigation. If arbitration
is not a viable option at this point, the employee should be allowed to
bring his claim in federal court since federal statutes such as Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the ADEA were
implemented to "provide minimum substantive guarantees to
individual workers."12
II. SUPREME COURT HISTORY ON ENFORCEABILITY OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
The Supreme Court's first opinion addressing compulsory
arbitration in the employment context came in 1974 in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.13 In this case, the Court refused to compel arbi-
tration of an employee's Title VII claim despite a binding arbitration
provision in the governing CBA.14 The Supreme Court, in the late
1980s, then issued a trilogy of opinions that allowed binding and final
arbitration of statutory claims under the Sherman Act, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO").15 In 1991, the Court issued its opinion in
Gilmer, which held that an employee must follow the grievance
procedures provided in his securities registration application to the
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").16 Before examining these three
12. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
13. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
14. See id. at 47-49.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
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steps in the Supreme Court's history, the importance of the Federal
Arbitration Act of 192517 and the controversy that surrounds it should
be examined.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
In 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
to place arbitration agreements on equal ground with more accepted
contractual agreements. 18 For the FAA to apply, the arbitration
agreement must first meet section 2 qualifications, namely that the
transaction "involve commerce."19  Employers may satisfy the
commerce requirement by showing that the employee's activities
affect interstate or foreign commerce, the employee produces goods for
interstate commerce, or the employee works in interstate commerce. 20
More recently, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "involving
commerce" in section 2 is as broad as "affecting commerce" in the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 21
Although section 2 appears relatively clear, section 1 of the
FAA produces special difficulty for arbitration agreements in em-
ployment contracts. Section 1 provides that "nothing herein con-
tained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce."22 The scope of the section 1 exclusion is of tremen-
dous importance to individual employment arbitration. If construed
broadly, the FAA will not apply to any employment contract.
Alternatively, section 1 could be interpreted narrowly to exclude only
contracts with transportation workers. In that case the FAA would
apply to all employment contracts except those involving
transportation workers.2
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
18. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
19. Section 2 of the FAA states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
20. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956).
21. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
23. In deciding whether the worker is engaged in transportation work, at least one court
has indicated that the focus is on the class of work and not on the actual activities of the worker.
See Rosen v. Transx Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that the FAA's
interstate transportation exception applied even though the driver's employment may not have
taken him across state boundaries).
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The circuit courts usually interpret the exclusionary language
of section 1 narrowly in light of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and D.C.
Circuits find the FAA applicable to employment contracts as long as
the agreement does not include workers actively involved in the
transportation industry.2 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit interprets
the section 1 employment contracts exclusion broadly and views the
FAA as inapplicable to all types of employment contracts and not just
those in the transportation industry.25 The Fourth Circuit held that
the term "interstate commerce" in section I should apply to employees
engaged in any type of interstate commerce and not just to workers
employed in the transportation industry.26 The Sixth Circuit,
meanwhile, appears to hold that individual employment contracts
include the provisions of the FAA for employees personally engaged in
the movement of goods in interstate commerce,2 7 while CBAs are
excluded from FAA coverage. 28  Finally, the Ninth Circuit has not
decided the scope of section 1 of the FAA, but at least one district
court in that circuit has held that the FAA does not apply to CBAs.29
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to decide the scope of the
FAA and employment contracts.3 0
24. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835-37 (8th Cir. 1997); Great W.
Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 226-27 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997);
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 357-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997);
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball
Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
25. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221,
224 (4th Cir. 1954); see also Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879
n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996) (stating that the Fourth Circuit does not rely on
the FAA as applying to CBAs).
26. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 215 F.2d at 224.
27. See Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 95-3432, 1997 WL 4783, at *2 (6th Cir.
Jan. 6, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 169 (1997); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d
592, 601 (6th Cir. 1995).
28. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that
CBAs are contracts of employment within the meaning of section 1 of the FAA and thus ex-
cluded from coverage of the Act); see also Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 959 F.
Supp. 805, 812 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (allowing plaintiff's claim to go forward because the FAA is
inapplicable to CBAs); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(following Willis and declaring that CBAs are excluded from provisions of the FAA). Neither
district court recognized the recent Sixth Circuit decisions which held that employment
contracts outside the transportation industry came under the FAA. See supra note 27.
29. See Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Gardner-
Denver and finding that the FAA does not apply to CBAs).
30. The Court in Gilmer refused to decide the applicability of the FAA because the securi-
ties registration application was not an agreement between employer and employee. See Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991).
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Although textualists and intentionalists would apply the FAA's
exclusionary language in section 1 broadly to all employment con-
tracts,31 the reach of the employment contract exception has been
restrictive. As will be shown later, the general acceptance by most
circuits that the FAA applies to employment agreements tends to
erase one of the three differences between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer.32
B. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and Its Progeny
In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court's first decision covering
arbitration of statutory claims in the labor context, the Court held
that a discharged employee who had previously arbitrated a
contractual grievance pursuant to an arbitration clause in a CBA
could still adjudicate his Title VII action even though it was based
upon the same conduct involved in the arbitration. 3  After being
terminated, the employee filed a claim for racial discrimination under
the CBA's contractual nondiscrimination clause.3 The grievance
procedures subjected the employee to binding arbitration under a
broad clause in the CBA, but the procedures did not explicitly address
waiver of statutory claims. 5 Prior to the arbitration hearing, the
employee also fied a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").36 The arbitrator ruled that the
employee had been discharged for "just cause,"37 and the EEOC
determined that no reasonable basis existed for the Title VII claim.
The employee then decided to fie a complaint in federal district
court.
38
The Supreme Court held that the prior submission of the em-
ployee's claim to arbitration under the CBA did not foreclose his
statutory right to trial under Title VII.39 The Court reasoned that
since Congress intended Title VII to make discrimination one of the
nation's highest priorities, the employee's right to statutory relief
31. See Jeffirey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section
1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J.
DisP. RESOL. 259, 304 (arguing that the FAA's text allows a broad interpretation of the
employment exclusion).
32. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
33. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
34. See id at 39.
35. See id. at 40-42 & n.3.
36. See id. at 42.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 43.
39. See id. at 47.
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should not be forfeited because of an arbitration agreement between
the employer and the employee's union.40 Distinguishing between a
statutory right related to collective activity, such as the right to
strike, and a statutory "right to equal employment opportunities," the
Court held that individual rights conferred by Title VII were not part
of the collective-bargaining process because "waiver of these rights
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title
VII."41 The Court indicated that Gardner-Denver did not include a
knowing and voluntary waiver.42 It emphasized this conclusion by
stating that in "no event can the submission to arbitration of a claim
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment constitute a binding waiver with respect to an employee's rights
under Title VII."43 The Court reasoned that the employee's Title VII
action asserted a separate statutory right independent of the arbitra-
tion process 44 and noted that it was reluctant to depend on the
competence of arbitrators to apply public law concepts. 45
In 1981 and 1984, the Supreme Court affirmed the Gardner-
Denver decision. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that an employee's claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") could be brought in federal court
even though a grievance procedure existed in the governing CBA.46
The Court followed its decision in Gardner-Denver and held that
courts should defer to arbitral decisions for employment rights found
in the CBA unless the employee's claim is based on statutory rights
"designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers."47  The Court also noted three major concerns with
arbitration of statutory claims by employees covered under a CBA.
First, the Court argued that a union may not pursue zealously the
employee's rights if vindication of those rights would not benefit the
union membership as a whole.48 Second, the Court again questioned
40. See id. at 47-49. "[F]inal responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with
federal courts." Id. at 44. "The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress
intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to
arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal." Id. at 56.
41. Id. at 51. The Court stated that the union's reciprocal promise not to strike is the
"primary incentive" for employers to enter into arbitration agreements. Id. at 54.
42. See id. at 52 n.15.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 54.
45. See id. at 57 ("[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law
of the shop, not the law of the land.").
46. See 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981).
47. Id. at 737.
48. See id. at 742.
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the competency of arbitrators to hear statutory claims that address
significant public policy issues.49 Finally, the Court noted that an
arbitrator may not be authorized to provide the type of relief sought
by the employee.50
Similarly, in McDonald v. City of West Branch, the Supreme
Court held that federal courts should not attach res judicata or collat-
eral-estoppel effect to awards received through arbitration pursuant
to terms of a CBA.51 In McDonald, a police officer filed a grievance
under the CBA and lost.52 He then filed a section 1983 action alleging
he was terminated for exercising various First Amendment rights . 3
The Court again followed Gardner-Denver and reiterated its concerns
with the effects of allowing individual statutory claims to be com-
pelled to arbitrate through terms of a CBA.54
C. Mitsubishi Trilogy of Arbitration Cases Addressing
Statutory Claims
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court decided three cases that
recognized statutory claims could be the subject of an arbitration
agreement. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the Supreme Court enforced an arbitration agreement involving
a claim brought under the Sherman Act.55 The Court held that if a
party makes a bargain to arbitrate, "the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."56 The Court
reasoned that by submitting to arbitration, "a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute, it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."57 Following
Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court also enforced arbitration agreements
relating to claims brought pursuant to RICO and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.58
49. See id. at 743.
50. See id. at 744-45.
51. See 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984).
52. See id. at 285-86.
53. See id. at 286.
54. See id. at 289-91.
55. See 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
56. Id. at 628.
57. Id.
58. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987)
(holding that Mitsubishi supports the arbitration of RICO claims and finding nothing in RICO's
text or legislative history that would preclude arbitration of such statutory claims); Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (holding that "resort to
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D. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme
Court held for the first time that an agreement to arbitrate an em-
ployment discrimination claim was enforceable under the FAA, and
the Court barred the employee from seeking relief in federal court.59
The employer, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation ("Interstate"),
had hired Robert Gilmer as Manager of Financial Services.60 Gilmer
registered as a securities representative with the NYSE.61 His
registration application provided that he arbitrate "any dispute, claim
or controversy" with his employer as required under the rules,
constitutions, or bylaws of the NYSE.62 One of the NYSE's rules
provided for arbitration of "[any controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of
the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative."63
In 1987, when Gilmer was sixty-two years old, Interstate
terminated Gilmer's employment.64 Gilmer filed a charge with the
EEOC and brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the
ADEA.65 Interstate responded with a motion to compel arbitration of
the ADEA claim based on the arbitration agreement in his NYSE
registration application.66 Following the reasoning of the Mitsubishi
trilogy,67 the Supreme Court held that a claim under the ADEA was
subject to arbitration. 6
The Court based its holding on three arguments and dis-
tinguished its decision in Gardner-Denver without overruling it.
First, the Court held that in enacting the ADEA, Congress had not
indicated an intention to preclude a waiver of the judicial forum for
ADEA claims.69 The Court found nothing in the text of the statute or
its legislative history that specifically precluded arbitration.70 Second,
the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights
afforded... under the Securities Act").
59. See 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
60. See id. at 23.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (alteration in original).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 23-24.
66. See id. at 24.
67. See supra Part 1.C.
68. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
69. See id. at 29.
70. See id.
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the Court rejected the plaintiffs challenges to the adequacy of the
arbitration procedure.71 The Court noted that in the Mitsubishi tril-
ogy it had refuted attacks on the arbitration process as being "far out
of step" with the current endorsement of federal statutes favoring
arbitration.72 Third, the Court refused to hold arbitration agreements
relating to ADEA claims unenforceable due to "mere inequality in
bargaining power" between the parties. 73 The Court, however, did
note that an arbitration agreement could be revoked under normal
contract principles of fraud or "overwhelming economic power."74
In refusing to follow the Gardner-Denver precedent, the Gilmer
Court recognized three distinctions. First, the Court noted that
Gardner-Denver did not address the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims but rather addressed the issue of whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded the adjudication of
subsequent statutory claims. 7s Second, the arbitration in Gardner-
Denver occurred in the context of a CBA where the claimants were
represented by a union in arbitration proceedings. 76 Unlike Gilmer,
the collective representative posed a potential disparity of interest
with the individual employee he represented. Third, the Court noted
that in contrast to Gardner-Denver, Gilmer was decided under the
FAA, which reflected a liberal policy in favor of arbitration.7
71. See id. at 30-32. The Court also pointed out the requirement under NYSE rules for all
arbitration awards to be in writing, including the names of the parties. See id. at 31-32. This
requirement, according to the Court, countered the argument that arbitration was insufficient
in that it does not provide public knowledge of employers' discrimination policies. See id. at 31-
32.
72. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1987)).
73. Id. at 33; see also Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 229 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997) (following Gilmer by holding that more than a disparity in
bargaining power between employer and employee is needed to show that the agreement is not
entered into willingly).
74. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
75. See id. at 35.
76. See id.
77. See id. In a footnote, the Gilmer Court noted that it did not have to decide whether
the exclusion in section 1 of the FAA regarding "contracts of employment" applied under the
facts of this, case because the arbitration clause at issue was "in Gilmer's securities registration
application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate." Id. at 25
n.2. The Court stated that it would "leave for another day" the issue of whether an arbitration
agreement contained in a standard employment contract or application would be enforceable.
Id.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that arbitration clauses in employment
agreements are excluded from coverage under the FAA; thus, Gilmer should not be compelled to
arbitrate his ADEA claim. See id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reviewed
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:687
E. Lower Court Decisions Since Gilmer: Defining the Distinctions
Between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer
Since Gilmer, many lower courts have struggled to distinguish
it from Gardner-Denver.78 While the Gilmer Court made three dis-
tinctions between the two cases, 79 lower courts tend to emphasize only
the second difference: whether the arbitration clause is included in
an individual employment agreement or a CBA.8 Generally, lower
courts have compelled arbitration of an employment statutory claim
when the employee knowingly and voluntarily signed an individual
agreement with the employer. 81 Meanwhile, courts hesitate to enforce
arbitration clauses included in CBAs. 82
Following Gilmer, circuit courts enforced mandatory
arbitration clauses in securities registration applications. Decisions
in the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have compelled
arbitration of statutory claims where the clause was included in a
securities registration application or similar form.m In these cases,
legislative history and congressional intent to determine that the FAA does not cover any
employment contracts. See id. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Gilmer has been criticized for avoiding the interpretation of section 1. See, e.g., Stempel,
supra note 31, at 276-77.
78. See, e.g., Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer:
Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
347, 366-67 (1997). The author notes five issues left unresolved after Gilmer: (1) whether the
FAA applies to employment agreements; (2) whether the decision applies outside of the highly
regulated securities market; (3) whether a pre-employment arbitration agreement could be
considered a contract of adhesion; (4) what would be required to find the arbitral process
unconscionable; and (5) what constitutes a valid waiver of an individual's statutory right to a
judicial forum.
79. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
80. Compare Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in an individual contract) with Varner v. National Super
Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause in a
CBA), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997). As noted earlier, only the Fourth Circuit excludes all
employment agreements from the FAA. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Thus,
the fact that Gilmer applied the FAA and Gardner-Denver did not cannot affect the outcome of
cases except in the Fourth Circuit, which still excludes employment contracts from the
provisions of the FAA.
81. See, e.g., infra note 85.
82. See, e.g., infra note 103.
83. See Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.
1994) (forcing arbitration, under the FAA, of a Title VII claim because of the employee's consent
in a securities registration application); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161,
1163 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that an employee's Title VII claim was subject to a mandatory
arbitration provision contained in a contract with the securities exchange); Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (compelling arbitration
under FAA of a Title VII claim after employee had signed an arbitration agreement in securities
registration application); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that discrimination claims were subject to an arbitration clause in a securities
regulation form).
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the lower courts relied on the precedent and similar facts of Gilmer.
As in Gilmer, the circuit courts avoided the question of the
exclusionary language of section 1 of the FAA. Instead the courts
found the FAA applicable because the employee's agreement with the
securities exchange was not an employment contract.3
Most courts continue to expand Gilmer beyond securities
registration applications to individual employee agreements where
the employee knowingly and voluntarily signs an arbitration
agreement. The Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
enforced arbitration agreements included in employment applications,
handbooks and preemployment agreements.85 The only courts that
have refused to compel arbitration in an individual employment
agreement focus on the requirement of knowing and voluntary
consent by the employee.1 The Ninth Circuit adopted a "knowing
waiver" requirement to invalidate arbitration agreements in two
separate cases. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai, the
court refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause because the
agreement did not refer specifically to statutory claims or employment
disputes,87 The employees had to sign a securities registration
application similar to Gilmer.88 The employees then registered with
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which
required disputes "arising in connection with the business" of its
84. See Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488; see also supra note 77 (discussing the Gilmer Court's avoid-
ance of this issue).
85. See Patterson, 113 F.3d at 833-34, 838 (requiring arbitration under the FAA of a Title
VII claim after the employee had signed the back page of an employment handbook); Great W.
Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 224-25 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997)(compelling arbitration under the FAA of a sexual harassment claim brought by an employee
who had signed an arbitration agreement in her application and in a more detailed arbitration
agreement after her employment); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (enforcing arbitration of Title VII claim where the employee had signed a preemployment
arbitration agreement); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)(compelling arbitration of Title VII claim due to provision contained in employee handbook).
86. See Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 1997)(reying on Lai); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on
Gilmer). In Gilmer, the Court noted that the employee was an experienced businessman who
was not "coerced or defrauded" into signing the agreement. The Court also stated that
"arbitration agreements are enforceable 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.'" 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
87. See 42 F.3d at 1305. See generally Christine K. Biretta, Comment, Prudential
Insurance Company of America v. Lai: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Arbitration?, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 595 (1997) (arguing that Lai is the beginning of the end for mandatory
arbitration and marks a return to Gardner-Denver).
88. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1301.
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members to be arbitrated.89 Thus, the facts in Lai mirrored those in
Gilmer except that the employee registered with the NASD instead of
the NYSE, and the NASD used slightly different language in its
arbitration agreement. Still, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the
signed arbitration agreement because neither the employment
contract nor the arbitration agreement gave adequate notice that the
arbitration process covered Title VII claims.9 The Court held that its
"knowing waiver" requirement reflected public policy goals of Title
VII, including protecting victims of sexual discrimination and
harassment. These goals were at least as strong as the public policy
favoring arbitration.91
The Ninth Circuit followed Lai in its subsequent decision in
Renteria v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America.92 The only difference
between the two cases was the language in the securities registration
application.9 3 The application signed by the plaintiff stated that the
undersigned must arbitrate all disputes listed in the NASD code "as
may be amended from time to time."94 The court held that the "as
amended" language "simply [did] not cure the flaw the Lai court
found in the agreement to arbitrate."95 Again, the court found that
neither the employment contract nor the securities registration
application expressly included employment disputes in the arbitration
agreement.96
The Ninth Circuit decisions imply that the court may have
compelled arbitration if the agreement expressly included employ-
ment statutory claims. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Cosgrove v.
Shearson Lehman Brothers enforced an arbitration clause in an
employment application expressly covering labor disputes.97 The
court in Cosgrove distinguished Lai because in Cosgrove, the
arbitration agreement expressly included language referring to
employment disputes.98
89. See id. The NYSE application required arbitration of "[amny controversy between a
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employ-
ment or termination of employment of such registered representative." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
90. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
91. See id.
92. 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
93. See id. at 1106.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1107.
96. See id. at 1108.
97. No. 95-3432, 1997 WL 4783, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 169
(1997).
98. Id. The application included the following language: "I hereby agree that any
controversy arising out of or in connection with my compensation, employment or termination of
employment shall be submitted to arbitration ...." Id. at *1.
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Other courts have rejected Lai's "knowing waiver" requirement
as contrary to Supreme Court history and based on inadequate legis-
lative history. In Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., the district court found
that Lai relied too much on a committee report from the House of
Representatives.9 Instead, the Maye court interpreted the require-
ment of knowing consent consistently with the "duty to read" doctrine
of contract law.1°° The court held that absent fraud or deception, un-
der state law, a person who signs or accepts a written contract is
conclusively presumed to know and to assent to the content of the
contract. 101
Thus, courts generally protect the freedom to contract between
individual employees and their employers as long as the employer can
show the employee knowingly and voluntarily consented to the arbi-
tration agreement. The use of arbitration clauses in CBAs, however,
has met a different fate in the majority of circuit courts. In Gilmer,
the Supreme Court distinguished Gardner-Denver by noting that in
Gardner-Denver, a tension existed between collective representation
and individual statutory rights. 0 2 In other words, the statutory rights
that generally protect minority groups may not be available to those
represented by a collective union. The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits have followed this distinction and held that a
union-represented employee could not be forced to submit a statutory
claim to arbitration under a provision in a CBA.1°s These courts found
Gardner-Denver to be the controlling authority. For example, the
court in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. refused to ignore the context in
which an arbitration clause arose and distinguished Gilmer as
applying only to individual employment contracts.' °4 Furthermore,
Judge Posner in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., focused on the
"essential conflict... between majority and minority rights" and
found that the union is not always highly sensitive to minority
99. See 897 F. Supp. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (referring to the Lai court's dependence on a
committee report from the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
100. See id. at 107-08. In Maye, two employees completed and executed documents entitled
"Principles of Employment" as part of the hiring process. The employees argued that during
orientation, they signed a number of documents without an adequate opportunity to read all of
the materials and that the employer never mentioned the arbitration clause. See id. at 102-04.
101. See id. at 108.
102. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,35 (1991).
103. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525-26 (11th Cir. 1997);
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1451-54 (10th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362-65 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997); Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997).
104. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453-54.
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workers' statutorily protected special interests, nor will the union
"seek to vindicate those interests with maximum vigor."105
The distinction between CBAs and individual contracts often
has caused the same circuit to enforce an arbitration provision in an
employment contract yet refuse to recognize the same provision in a
CBA.O6 District courts have followed the courts of appeals in distin-
guishing between individual employment contracts and CBAs.107 For
example, the court in Darby v. North Mississippi Rural Legal
Services, Inc., held that an employee who filed an ADA claim in
federal court was not required to exhaust grievance procedures
contained in a CBA.10s The court stated that "Gilmer is inapplicable,
since it involved an arbitration clause in an individual employment
contract, as opposed to an arbitration clause contained within a
CBA."109
III. DISSOLVING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GARDNER-DENVER AND
GILMER: THE EMERGENCE OFAUSTIN V. OWENS-BROCKWAY
GLASS CONTAINER, INC.
The lower courts' applications of Gardner-Denver or Gilmer,
based on whether the arbitration clause was included in a CBA or
105. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362-63.
106. Compare Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in an individual contract), with Varner, 94 F.3d at 1213 (Eighth
Circuit refusing to compel arbitration under CBA provision); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1994) (Tenth Circuit requiring
arbitration in securities registration application), with Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453-54 (failing to
require arbitration under union's CBA); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699
(11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (enforcing arbitration clause in securities registration application),
with Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 525-26 (Eleventh Circuit following Alexander and not compelling
arbitration of statutory claim pursuant to CBA agreement).
107. See Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a
CBA can waive only contractual rights of the collective union and not individual statutory
rights); Bush v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that
a "union may not waive an employee's right under Title VII to bring a claim in federal court");
Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (stating employees are "not
required to arbitrate their statutory claims under the terms of the CBA"); Randolph v. Cooper
Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518, 521-22 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to enforce mandatory arbitration
clause in CBA); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co., 858 F. Supp. 802, 804 (C.D. IlM. 1994)
(holding that an employee need not exhaust grievance procedures under CBA before bringing
Title VII claim to court); Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D. Conn.
1993) (concluding that a "collective bargaining agreement cannot... require an employee to
arbitrate individual statutory claims"). But see Battle v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 973 F.
Supp. 861, 866-67 (D. Minn. 1997) (enforcing an arbitration agreement in a securities registra-
tion application).
108. See No. 1:96CV214-B-A, 1997 WL 88241, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 28, 1997).
109. Id.
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individual contract, created a rather bright-line distinction: If the
case is brought by a union employee, courts follow Gardner-Denver
and allow the claim to be heard in federal court; if a nonunion
employee brings the claim, courts follow Gilmer and compel
arbitration.110  The Fourth Circuit, however, eliminated this
distinction in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc."' In
Austin, an employee alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Title VII. She claimed her employer refused to
offer her light-duty work after she was injured on the job. The
company eliminated her job classification and terminated her
employment yet reassigned a male in the same job classification to
another position.112 The CBA, to which the female employee was a
party, stated that "[a]ll disputes... may be referred to arbitration." m
The Fourth Circuit, in an unprecedented step, declared no distinction
should be made between a CBA and an individual employment
contract."4 Instead, the court held:
Whether the dispute arises under a contract of employment growing out of [a]
securities registration application, a simple employment contract, or a
collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been made to arbitrate
the dispute. So long as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and we are of
the opinion it should be enforced." 5
The Fourth Circuit, ironically, is the only circuit that main-
tains all employment agreements are excluded under the "contracts of
employment" language in section 1 of the FAA.116 Thus, instead of
relying on the FAA, the Austin court based its decision on" 'the well-
110. "After Gilmer, lower courts have struggled to answer the question of whether federal
statutory claims that are subject to compulsory arbitration under the terms of collective bar-
gaining agreements may instead be brought in federal court." Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer
Prods., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 805, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
111. See 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432(1996).
112. See id. at 877-78.
113. Id. at 880 (emphasis added). The court determined that the word "may" did not make
arbitration permissive. Instead, the use of "may" in the arbitration clause gave the employee
the choice between arbitration and abandonment of her claim. See id. at 879.
114. See id. at 885. See generally Katherine L. Kettler, Annual Survey of Labor Law, 38
B.C. L. REv. 303, 358-70 (1997) (reviewing Austin and arguing that the Supreme Court needs to
clarify the remaining significance between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer).
115. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885. The court further stated: There is no reason to distinguish
between a union bargaining away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the right to
arbitrate. The right to arbitrate is a term or condition of employment, and as such, the union
may bargain for this right." Id. But see id. at 886 (Hall, J., dissenting) (declaring that the "[t]he
majority fails to recognize ... that the only difference makes all the difference").
116. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that employment
contracts are excluded from the coverage of the Arbitration Act).
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recognized policy of federal labor law favoring arbitration of labor
disputes.' "117 Since the case did not arise under the FAA and the
arbitration provision was included in a CBA, Gardner-Denver ap-
peared to be the logical precedent to follow.118 The court, however,
explained that the employee had agreed voluntarily to the arbitration
of her statutory complaints."1 In so doing, the court effectively elimi-
nated two of the distinctions between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver.
First, the court followed Gilmer even though it did not rely on the
FAA's encouragement of arbitration.120 Second, the court did not fol-
low other circuits in distinguishing cases where employees are cov-
ered by CBAs and their statutory rights are waived by a union repre-
sentative. 21 In effect, the Fourth Circuit declared that Gilmer should
apply to all arbitration claims in employment disputes and that
Gardner-Denver no longer had any precedential value.
The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the distinction between
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer raises the critical issue of whether a
union employee should be allowed remedies different from a nonunion
employee when filing statutory discrimination claims. Austin's un-
precedented approach in examining arbitration clauses in CBAs de-
serves close examination before dismissing it as against Supreme
Court precedent.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND STRATEGIC CHOICES: WHY COURTS SHOULD
ADOPT GARDNER-DENVER AS APPLYING TO ALL
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
The Fourth Circuit in Austin took an unprecedented step by
refusing to distinguish between union and nonunion employees. The
decision does provide for a notion of horizontal equity among all
American employees. In other words, employees on the same level in
different companies receive the same remedies whether or not they
are represented by a union. 22 Still, public policy and strategic
117. Austin, 78 F.3d at 879 (quoting Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1985) and declaring that the court need not rely on the FAA).
118. See supra Parts II.B and note 110 and accompanying text.
119. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 883 n.2.
120. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the first distinction made by the
Gilrner court in distinguishing Gardner-Denver: its reliance on the FAA).
121. See supra Part .E (discussing the second distinction made by the Gilmer court in
distinguishing Gardner-Denver: the tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights).
122. Cf GEORGE T. MILKOVICH & JERRY M. NEWMAN, COMPENSATION 277-79 (4th ed. 1993)
(discussing equity theory among employees and how the key element is not actual equity across
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business choices show that the Austin court's decision to follow
Gilmer instead of Gardner-Denver is inappropriate. Courts should
follow Austin and not distinguish between employees based on where
the arbitration clause is included. In contrast to Austin, however,
courts should allow every employee the right to litigate in federal
court if the employee so desires. An examination of legislative
history, government statements, private organizations' actions, and
strategic business policies leads to the conclusion that preemployment
mandatory arbitration agreements of statutory claims should not be
used as a condition for employment.
A. The Adoption of Austin by District Courts
Few courts have followed Austin's holding that no distinction
should exist between an arbitration clause included in a securities
registration application, an employment contract, or a CBA.12 One
district court opinion, however, shows the danger in compelling arbi-
tration regardless of the context of the compulsory arbitration clause.
In Moore v. Duke Power Co., an employee missed work for an ex-
tended period of time due to a disabflity.Y4 Upon return, the employer
demoted, denied transfers to, suspended, and later terminated the
employee.25 After being dismissed, the employee pursued a remedy
under the grievance procedures provided by the CBA.126 The
arbitrator in these procedures refused to allow the employee's attor-
ney to participate, and the union representative declined to address
the employee's ADA claim, relying only on contractual claims of dis-
lines but "perceived" equity). Currently, the majority of circuits allow union-represented
employees to litigate their statutory claims despite an arbitration provision in the CBA, while
the same courts will often compel arbitration of an employee's statutory claim when governed by
an individual arbitration agreement. See supra note 106.
123. See Breech v. Alabama Power Co., 962 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 n.6 (S.D. Ala. 1997)
(declaring that Austin was decided erroneously and that Gardner-Denver has not been over-
ruled); Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 790-91 (D.N.J. 1997) (declaring that
"Austin has not been universally accepted" and noting that the "Gilmer Court went out of its
way" to distinguish Gardner-Denver partly based on the distinction between a CBA and an
individual contract); Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 805, 812 (M.D.
Tenn. 1997) (noting that the "Austin court... failed to acknowledge the clear distinctions drawn
by the Gilmer Court between compulsory arbitration under individual contracts and collective
bargaining agreements"); Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737, 743 (W.D. Cal. 1996)
(disagreeing with Austin on two grounds: Gardner-Denver is still good law and the difference
between a CBA and individual contract "makes all the difference.").
124. See 971 F. Supp. 978, 980 (W.D.N.C. 1997).
125. See id.
126. See id.
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crimination. 2 7 The arbitrator denied the union's claim and found the
employee had been terminated for "just and proper cause."123
The employee then sought relief for his ADA claim in federal
court.129 The district court of the Fourth Circuit followed the prece-
dent established in Austin.130 The court required the employee to
pursue final and binding arbitration under the CBA and precluded
review of the arbitrator's decision absent a showing that the union
breached its duty of fair representation. 3' The court found that the
union's failure to bring the employee's ADA discrimination claim
constituted either negligence or "merely... a strategic error."32 In a
decision that was highly deferential to the union's judgment, the court
found that this negligent error did not breach the duty of fair
representation by the union.133
Moore illustrates the tension between individual statutory
rights and collective representation that concerned the Supreme
Court in Gilmer.'3 Because the employee was not allowed to use his
own attorney and had to rely on the union for representation, he was
effectively barred from bringing his ADA claim due to the union rep-
resentative's negligence.
At least two more district courts have followed Austin. In
Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the court required an employee to
arbitrate his section 1981 race discrimination claim pursuant to an
express provision in the governing CBA.135 The Almonte court found
that since the CBA expressly prohibited discrimination as defined by
federal law, the case fell between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer.136 The
court followed the reasoning in Austin and the federal policy favoring
arbitration.3 7
127. See id. at 980-81.
128. Id. at 980.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 984.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 985. The court stated: "'A union's exercise of its judgment need not appear as
wise in the glaring light of hindsight, and a violation of the duty of fair representation is not
made out by proof that the union made a mistake in judgment.'" Id. at 984 (quoting Smith v.
Local 7898, United Steelworkers, 834 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir. 1987)).
133. See id. at 984-85. "'Simple negligence, ineffectiveness, or poor judgment is
insufficient to establish a breach of the union's duty .... Rather, the union's conduct must be
"grossly deficient" or in reckless disregard of the member's rights.'" Id. at 984 (quoting Ash v.
United Parcel Servs., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)).
134. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
135. See 959 F. Supp. 569,574 (D. Conn. 1997).
136. See id. at 573.
137. See id. at 574. Ironically, the same district court held in an earlier case that an em-
ployee did not need to exhaust grievance procedures under a CBA before bringing a Title VII
action in federal court. See Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, 819 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D. Conn.
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In Jessie v. Carter Health Care Center, Inc., a district court
also held that a CBA provision made arbitration obligatory. 3 8 The
employee, therefore, could not bring a Title VII claim into federal
court. In this case, the employee alleged that her employer
constructively discharged her due to her pregnancy. 39 The court
simply stated that except for Austin, very little precedent existed on
the issue of whether an agreement between parties in a CBA to
arbitrate statutory claims was enforceable.140 The court held that
Jessie was "on all fours with... Austin and the.., law as stated in
Austin [was] sound."14' This decision once again caused an employee
who never signed any waiver of her statutory rights to lose her claim
in court due to an agreement between her union and her employer.
The decision in Austin and its effect on the opinions in Moore,
Almonte, and Jessie show the dangerous effects of enforcing an
arbitration clause provided in CBAs. The Austin court made a well-
reasoned argument that an employee covered by a CBA should not be
treated differently than an employee covered under an individual
contract. 42 The court, however, made a poor decision to develop a per
se rule that arbitration should be compelled unless Congress indicates
otherwise. The decisions in Moore and Almonte demonstrate that this
rule can lead to adverse consequences. In Moore, the employee was
effectively barred from bringing his ADA claim due to the union's
negligence or "strategic error" in addressing the claim during the
grievance procedures43 In Almonte, the employee followed the
grievance procedure and received a second award from the arbitrator
1993). The Almonte court, however, used the same reasoning as Claps. See Almonte, 959 F.
Supp. at 574. In Claps, the court suggested the use of a rebuttable presumption: "Courts would
assume that individual statutory claims were excluded from grievance procedures unless the
collective bargaining agreement expressly provided otherwise." Claps, 819 F. Supp. at 147 n.6.
The Almonte court adopted that standard, and proceeded to find that, unlike the CBA in Claps,
the CBA governing Almonte expressly prohibited discrimination under federal law and required
arbitration of these claims. See Almonte, 959 F. Supp. at 574. The effect of the Almonte
decision was to force the same employee to arbitrate a racial discrimination claim two years
after the same employee had received an arbitrator's award for racial harassment by the same
employer. See id. at 573. One could argue that the employee did not believe the previous
arbitration effectively deterred the employer and that the employee was now seeking a public
rather than a private forum in order to increase pressure on the employer to stop
discriminating.
138. See 930 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
139. See id. at 1175-76.
140. See id. at 1176.
141. See id.
142. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
143. Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 878, 984-85 (W.D.N.C. 1997).
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after his first claim of racial harassment.44 Since the discriminatory
conduct continued, however, the employee apparently decided to seek
retribution in a public forum.'-1 Instead of the employee receiving
public disclosure of the discriminatory practices, the court followed
Austin and required the employee to arbitrate his claim again in a
private forum. 146 Finally, the Jessie court simply adopted the per se
rule established by Austin without debating the consequences of its
decision. 47
The adverse consequences of these decisions demonstrate that
Austin should have reached an opposite result. Courts and Congress
should realize that an employee is an employee when trying to eradi-
cate discrimination in the workplace. In effect, each individual should
have the same remedies available whether a CBA or an individual
agreement covers the employee's grievance procedures. Allowing a
union employee recourse in the federal courts and disallowing the
same claim brought by a nonunion employee seems unfair. Congress
and employers should realize this inequity and stop forcing an
individual employee's statutory discrimination claims into private
arbitration proceedings.
B. Public Policy Arguments Against Compulsory Arbitration
The Supreme Court in Gilmer decided that individual em-
ployee's statutory claims are appropriate for arbitration. 148 It further
explained that if Congress intended to preclude a waiver of the judi-
cial forum that intent would be shown in the "text of the [applicable
statute], its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbi-
tration and the [statute's] underlying purposes."149 Proponents of
compulsory arbitration agreements use this argument when seeking
arbitration of claims brought under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress added the following
language to Title VII and the ADEA:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
144. See Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D. Conn. 1997).
145. See supra note 137.
146. See Almonte, 959 F. Supp. at 574.
147. See Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., 930 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky 1996)
(deciding the case without discussing contrary authority); see also supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
148. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (following the
precedent established by the Mitsubishi trilogy of cases).
149. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, .82 U.S. 220,226 (1987)).
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facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended
by this title.150
The ADA contains nearly identical language. 151 While employ-
ers often cite this language when ADA, ADEA and Title VII claims
are brought to federal court, the legislative history shows that
Congress did not intend for arbitration to replace the federal court
system.152
The House Report to the adoption of the ADA stated that al-
ternative dispute resolution was "intended to supplement, not sup-
plant" ADA remedies. 153 The report implies that even voluntary
agreements were not intended to interfere with an individual's right
to sue in federal court.154 According to the report, the committee be-
lieved that arbitration agreements, whether in collective bargaining
agreements or in employment contracts, did "not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this
Act." 55 Furthermore, the report stated that Gardner-Denver applied
equally to the ADA.156 Congress did not intend for the inclusion of
this provision to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise
be available to persons with disabilities. The House Conference
Report added that while the use of these alternative dispute
resolutions were voluntary, "[u]nder no condition would an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement or employment
contract prevent an individual from pursuing their rights under the
ADA."ir57
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the ADA encourage arbitra-
tion of statutory claims by employees, and courts use these
amendments to show a congressional intent in favor of arbitration for
150. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)
(emphasis added).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
152. See Hill v. American Natl Can ColFoster Forbes Glass Div., 952 F. Supp. 398, 406
(N.D. Tex. 1996) (relying on legislative history to state that "[e]ven voluntary agreements to
arbitrate were not intended to interfere with an individual's right to sue... under the ADA.").
153. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,499.
154. See Hill, 952 F. Supp. at 406-07.
155. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 76-77; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97 (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (including the same language in reference to similar
amendments added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 77; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97 (including the
same language in reference to similar amendments added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
157. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-596, at 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 598
(emphasis added).
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statutory claims.,, 8 Unlike most lower court decisions since Gilmer,
however, the legislative history does not make a distinction between
CBAs and individual employment contracts.159 In fact, the reports
apply to both types of agreements. At the same time, Congress
implicitly approved of the Gardner-Denver decision.160 The last
sentence in House Conference Report 596 provides the strongest
authority, stating that "under no condition" can a CBA or employment
contract waive an employee's rights under federal discrimination
statutes. 6'
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
"encourage" post-dispute voluntary arbitration and not
preemployment compulsory agreements. Arbitration provides a more
efficient route if both parties voluntarily agree to the process, but to
force a party to agree to arbitrate before the claim arises constitutes
coercion. As one district court noted, Gardner-Denver and subsequent
legislative history indicate that an employee can exercise his or her
rights in either court or arbitration. 62 In other words, the worker
may voluntarily choose between arbitration or litigation. Either way,
if the employee knowingly chooses his action, then the court will
respect that decision.
Since Gilmer and the extension of its decision by many circuit
and district courts, congressional leaders have attempted to draft
explicit legislation to exclude preemployment arbitration agreements
that compel arbitration of federal discrimination claims. The first bill
on this matter, known as the Protection from Coercive Employment
Agreements Act, was introduced in the Senate on April 13, 1994.163
The bill proposed to amend Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and section 1977 of the Revised Statues of
the United States by making it illegal to force employees to sign
arbitration agreements that included federal discrimination claims
before accepting employment. 64
158. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881 (4th Cir.)
(arging that the statutory language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "could not be any more clear
in showing Congressional favor towards arbitration"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (stating that
an agreement to arbitrate does not preclude judicial relief "whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or in an employment contract"); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 76-77 (same).
160. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97 (stating Congress's intent not to preclude judicial relief is
consistent with Gardner-Denver); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 77 (same).
161. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 89.
162. See Hill v. American Nat'l Can ColFoster Forbes Glass Div., 952 F. Supp. 398, 407
(N.D. Tex. 1996).
163. S. 2012, 103d Cong. §§ 2-6 (1994).
164. See id. For example, the bill would amend Title VII by adding-
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A more recent version of the bill, the Civil Rights Procedures
Protection Act of 1994, was introduced in both the House and Senate.
This bill would keep the statutory relief as the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination unless "after such claim arises the claim-
ant voluntarily enters into an agreement to resolve such claim through
arbitration or another procedure."165 The bill differed most from the
previous bill in that it restricted the arbitration of the discrimination
claim itself instead of focusing only on agreements in employment
contracts. 166
The legislative history of the amendments encouraging arbi-
tration and the proposed bills in the House and Senate appear to be
concerned over the same issue: whether an employee can still receive
his or her minimum guaranteed rights under federal law if employers
can condition employment on the employee agreeing to compulsory
private arbitration of federal statutory claims. The Supreme Court in
Barrentine identified the same concern. 167 Certain federal statutes,
such as the FLSA, give specific minimum protections to workers and
should not be endangered by coercive preemployment agreements
drafted by employers.
Thus, legislative history appears to follow Austin in that it
treats individual contracts and collective agreements alike.168
Congressional reports and proposed bills, however, show that
Congress's desire to encourage voluntary arbitration does not
necessarily mean the extension of Gilmer to all types of employment
agreements. Instead, the legislative history could be interpreted as
showing Congress's desire for post-dispute voluntary arbitration
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to-
(1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment of the individual, because the individual refuses to submit any claim under
this title to mandatory arbitration; or(2) make the submission of such claim to mandatory arbitration a condition of the
hiring, continued employment, or the compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, of the individual.
Id.
165. S. 2405, 103d Cong. §§ 2-9 (1994) (emphasis added); H.R. 4981, 103d Cong. §§ 2-9
(1994) (emphasis added). This bill would have amended the same statutes as the previous one
as well as the Equal Pay Requirement under the FL-SA, the FMILA, and the FAA. The bill was
reintroduced in the 104th Congress on February 7, 1995, in the Senate and July 27, 1996, in the
House of Representatives. H.R. 3748, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995).
166. See Brian K Van Engen, Note, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration:
The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to
Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391, 412 (1996) (arguing that the second proposed bill "has
more 'ite'... because it restricts arbitration of the claim itself).
167. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981).
168. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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agreements. Congress intended to provide employees with a choice of
two forums. If the employee wants retribution for back pay or dam-
ages and cannot afford the lengthy and expensive trial process, then
entering into voluntary arbitration after the claim arises should not
be discouraged. However, if the employee would rather address the
discriminatory conduct in a public forum for any reason, then the
employee should not be held to an agreement required as a condition
of employment.
In addition to the legislative branch, the executive branch, and
other government and private organizations have publicly criticized
compulsory arbitration agreements. Both the EEOC and the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") publicly oppose employment
contracts that force workers to arbitrate federal discrimination
claims.169
The Southern District of Texas recently granted the EEOC an
injunction to prevent an employer's use of its ADR policy, finding the
employer's arbitration policy misleading and against the principles of
Title VII.y° The court enjoined the employer from forcing an em-
ployee to enter into an ADR policy that required the employee to pay
the costs of the ADR proceedings, prevented or interfered with an
employee's right to file complaints with the EEOC or a court of law,
and retaliated against or terminated an employee who opposed the
mandatory ADR policy.17' Also, the EEOC now has the authority to
receive and process any discrimination charges filed by employees
regardless of the existence of an employment agreement or employer-
sponsored ADR program. 72
Private organizations have also begun to oppose compulsory
arbitration. The National Academy of Arbitrators ("NAA") and the
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") both issued recent state-
ments supporting voluntary, post-dispute arbitration, but opposing
mandatory arbitration based on pre-dispute agreements. 173 Another
provider of private arbitrators, JAMS/Endispute, recently issued
169. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Policies Requiring Arbitration Challenged, WAIL ST. J., Oct.
16, 1995, at B5. A regional director of the NLRB said, "The requirement that an employee or
job applicant sign a mandatory arbitration policy is an unlawful labor practice, as is their dis-
charge for not signing." Id.
170. See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, No. H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995).
171. See id.
172. See Motions on Alternative Dispute Resolution Adopted by the EEOC, April 25, 1995,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at El (Apr. 26, 1995).
173. Voluntary Arbitration in Worker Disputes Endorsed by Two Groups, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1997, at B2. Additionally, the National Academy of Arbitrators asked its members to refuse
to hear cases where "unfair" procedures were imposed by the employer. Id.
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"Minimal Standards of Procedural Fairness," which must be met in
the arbitration proceeding before it will accept arbitration from em-
ployers through mandatory arbitration clauses. 174 Under these stan-
dards, the arbitration process must provide the employee minimal
procedural protections, like those available in court, including the
right to full remedies, prehearing discovery, and representation by
counselY75 JAMS also recommends that employers "carefully consider
how to distribute costs and require a reasoned award."176 Finally,
directors of the NASD recently voted to stop mandating arbitration of
discrimination claims brought by its members.' 77
Lawyers giving advice to employers, therefore, may want to re-
examine legislative history and keep a close watch on Congress and
public opinion regarding mandatory arbitration clauses. If Congress
returns to pro-labor control, employers may be surprised when all
preemployment arbitration agreements are found void by operation of
law. Employers, however, should not make this decision solely on
advice from a lawyer or a prediction of congressional action. The
emergence of strategic human resources management ("SHRM") in
the past few years should lead employers to their own strategic
decision prior to the resolution by the courts.
C. Strategic Human Resources Management Perspective on
Compulsory Arbitration Agreements
When deciding how to handle employment disputes, employers
often seek the advice of their legal counsel. Since the Supreme Court
decision in Gilmer, many corporate attorneys hastily encourage em-
ployers to include broad mandatory arbitration clauses within em-
ployment applications, employee handbooks and offer letters.178 When
174. See S. Gale Dick, Major Providers Changing Employment ADR Procedures, as
Controversy Rages, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITG., Mar. 1995, at 34; see also Margaret A.
Jacobs, Workers Call Some Private Justice Unjust, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at Bi.
175. See Dick, supra note 174, at 34.
176. See id.
177. See Deborah Lohse, NASD Votes to End Arbitration Rule in Case of Bias, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 1997, at B14. The NASD included a compulsory arbitration provision in its U4 form, the
securities registration application for brokers. The decision to exclude the arbitration clause
arose from the "negative publicity" surrounding two recent discrimination suits against the two
largest brokerage firms, Merrill Lynch and Co., and Smith Barney. Id.
178. See Volin, supra note 2, at 19. In this article, a practicing attorney provides 16 tips to
employers considering arbitration of employment statutory claims. The tips include inserting
compulsory arbitration clauses into employee applications and handbooks as well as making the
provisions very broad. See id. at 17-19; see also Arthur D. Rutkowski, Mandatory Arbitration of
Job Bias Claims: An Employer's Panacea or Simply Two Bites of the Apple?, 45 LABOR L.J. 636,
640-41 (1994) (providing five guidelines to ensure an enforceable arbitration agreement).
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employers ask why, attorneys are quick to note five general argu-
ments in favor of arbitration: speed, cost, confidentiality, finality and
friendliness. 179  An employer who decides to adopt an SHRM
perspective,8 0 however, should begin by looking internally for answers
rather than to lawyers who thrive on controversy. 18' A closer
examination of each of these five "advantages" to employers reveals
competitive disadvantages from the SHRM perspective.
Most employers realize arbitration takes less time than litiga-
tion.182 The speed of arbitration, however, may not be as advanta-
geous at first glance. First, the speed of the process allows employees
to bring frivolous claims under the grievance procedures of the em-
ployment contract or CBA.83 Second, employers tend to believe arbi-
tration will be less expensive. Some commentators, however, argue
that the new trend of mandatory arbitration clauses only increases
179. See Mark Featherman, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements as an Unfair Labor
Practice: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. and the Resurgence of the Yellow Dog
Contract, 47 LABOR L.J. 162, 167-169 (1996) (noting speed, cost, finality, and friendliness as
advantageous); Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements
a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1028 (1996) (noting, among other advantages,
confidentiality).
180. Strategic human resources management ("SHRM") is a rather new business approach
adopted within the last decade. The employers' objective is 'to make better competitive use of
their firm's human resources and for human resource managers... to enhance the human
resource fumction's contribution to the strategic objectives of the firm." Cynthia A. Lengnick-
Hall & Mark L. Lengnick-Hall, Strategic Human Resource Management: A Review of the
Literature and a Proposed Typology, 13 AcAD. OF MGMT. REV. 454, 454 (1988). The premise of
SHRM arose from Michael Porter's theory of competitive advantages. See generally MICHAEL E.
PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985). For more general discussions and practical
applications of SHRM, see generally MICHAEL BEER ET AL., MANAGING HUMAN ASSETS (1984);
CHARLEs R. GREER, STRATEGY AND HUMAN RESOURCES: A GENERAL MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
(1995); Raymond E. Miles & Charles C. Snow, Designing Strategic Human Resources Systems,
13 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 36 (1984); Randall S. Schuler & Susan E. Jackson, Linking
Competitive Strategies with Human Resource Management Practices, 1 AcAD. OF MGMT.
EXECUTIVE 207 (1987).
181. Employers "need to invest more in our human resources professionals to create
internal systems that will minimize the number of disputes and less in lawyers who have a self-
interest in a continuation of disputes." Robert B. Fitzpatrick, The War in the Workplace Must
End, but Arbitration Is Not the Answer, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1289,
1300 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, 1997); see also Lewton, supra note 179, at 1033
(advising that "ADR processes should not be viewed as a substitute for sound human resource
management").
182. See Rutkowski, supra note 178, at 642.
183. See Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas, Is There a Better Way? Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims after Gilmer, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 197, 211
(1993-94) ("Arbitration... provides a more inviting forum for 'frivolous' claims because
arbitrators rarely will dismiss a case prior to hearing, and they generally do not award
sanctions.., for bringing such claims.").
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different forms of litigation.18 4 The number of open issues regarding
arbitration of employment claims since Gilmer supports this point.8 5
Instead of the parties litigating over discriminatory conduct, the
adversaries now dispute the correct forum for the claim and then,
depending on the court's decision, follow with the traditional battle
over discrimination either in court or in arbitration.
Confidentiality is a third advantage quoted to employers.86
Yet in Gilmer, the Supreme Court emphasized that NYSE rules re-
quired all arbitration decisions to be in writing.187 Whether the
Supreme Court views the right to public knowledge as a substantive
statutory right that cannot be waived under the Mitsubishi trilogy is
unclear.'8 A fourth advantage corporate lawyers often assert is the
finality of the arbitration process or its rather narrow appellate re-
view.189 Again, with the onslaught of mandatory arbitration clauses
and decisions such as Lai and Renteria, courts are beginning to
increase their judicial review of these "voluntary" agreements. 90
Moreover, as long as the circuit courts remain split and the Supreme
Court leaves open many questions following Gilmer and its distinction
with Gardner-Denver, courts will continue to scrutinize the
arbitration of statutory claims and employers may not know which
way a court will decide.
Finally, some commentators argue that arbitration is a friend-
lier process than litigation.191 From a strategic human resources per-
spective, this again may be false. The use of mandatory arbitration
184. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 181, at 1295. "Arbitration will not result in a decrease in
litigation, but rather a different form of litigation. While the issues will be different, the legal
bills will continue to be astronomical and the divisiveness will only be further exacerbated." Id.
185. See Lewton, supra note 179, at 1031 (suggesting that the issues left unresolved by
Gilmer will lead to ADR associated litigation as expensive and time-consuming as employment
litigation); see also Matthews, supra note 78, at 366-67 (discussing five issues left unresolved
after Gilmer).
186. See Lewton, supra note 179, at 1031.
187. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991) (noting that
Gilmer's arbitration required a written opinion including "the names of the parties, a summary
of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award issued").
188. See Lewton, supra note 179, at 1031.
189. See, e.g., Bompey & Pappas, supra note 183, at 211.
190. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text; see also Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49,
137-39 (1997) (asserting that expanded judicial review of arbitration decisions concerning
employee statutory claims would protect public policy); Anthony J. Jacob, Comment, Expanding
Judicial Review to Encourage Employers and Employees to Enter the Arbitration Arena, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 1099, 1124-25 (1997) (arguing that expanding judicial review to
discrimination claims arising from compulsory arbitration agreements will encourage employees
to use arbitration).
191. See Featherman, supra note 179, at 167-68.
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clauses as a form of boilerplate in employment agreements demon-
strates the employee's lack of bargaining power. Preemployment
agreements force potential employees to face the decision of signing
the contract or finding other employment.192 Unfortunately, if one
employer requires these agreements, chances are other employers will
require the same.193 At the time of the decision, moreover, employees
may not realize the importance of waiving their substantive statutory
rights. The threat of unemployment or inferior employment may be
enough to induce the employee to sign such agreements. 94 If the
employee must settle for grievance procedures later rather than seek
redress in federal court, the relationship between the employee and
employer will not be "friendlier" because of the forced arbitration. 95
Instead, the compulsory arbitration may leave the relationship
irreparable.
The competitive disadvantages involved with mandatory arbi-
tration clauses suggest that employers should think twice before
agreeing with the "easy" solution of forcing all employment disputes
into arbitration. The global marketplace demands that employers
seek competitive advantages from every aspect of their business.196
With service industries becoming more prevalent, employees become
the firm's largest asset. One commentator argues that employers
should provide meaningful choices about ADR programs to
employees. 97 The different programs include peer review, employee
assistance plans, an internal grievance program, mediation, and
arbitration.198 However, the most important message an employer
should relay is one of "mutual respect and dignity." 99 Pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements do not provide this message.
192. See Jacob, supra note 190, at 1118.
193. Cf John T. Dunlop & Arnold M. Zack, The New Frontier of Employment Dispute
Resolution, 1 PERSP. ON WORK 56, 57 (1997) (noting that in 1930, no more than 8 to 10% of
CBAs contained arbitration as a step in a grievance procedure, but by 1960, virtually all CBAs
contained some sort of arbitration clause).
194. See Jacob, supra note 190, at 1118.
195. As one commentator noted, "an employee gains the same 'advantages' of arbitration
whether he waives his right to a judicial forum prospectively or retrospectively." Featherman,
supra note 179, at 169. Thus, an employer adopting a SHRM perspective should realize that his
or her employees will not provide the same competitive advantages or have the same motivation
to work when the employee would have preferred to choose her option after the claim arises.
196. See PORTER, supra note 180, at xv (establishing a framework of competitive advan-
tages required for all companies seeking to profit in a world of slower domestic growth and
increased competition).
197. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 181, at 1297-98.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 1300.
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Instead, compulsory arbitration clauses in applications and
handbooks are simply unfair.200
V. SOLUTION FOR THE STATEGIc HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGER
After Austin, the last relevant distinction between Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver fell to scrutiny. Courts no longer apply a bright line
distinction between union and nonunion employees when deciding the
enforceability of arbitration clauses. As the Fourth Circuit held, it no
longer matters whether the dispute arises under a securities registra-
tion application, an employment contract, or a collective bargaining
agreement.201 Quite simply, an employee is an employee.
As the last section explained, legislative history, recent
Congressional action, statements and actions taken by government
organizations and private associations, and decisions by strategic
human resources managers suggest that courts should follow the
Austin reasoning and treat all employees similarly. In contrast to
Austin, however, courts should not bind any employee to a
preemployment arbitration agreement. Instead, the employee should
voluntarily decide the process for his or her statutory claim after the
dispute arises.
The legal uncertainty and likelihood that mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements of statutory claims may soon be void suggests that
employers should eliminate these provisions. Employers should in-
stead adopt preemployment agreements requiring employees to
discuss discriminatory conduct with supervisors before bringing
claims into federal court. Through discussions with higher-ranking
employees, the allegedly discriminated employee may find that arbi-
tration is the best choice for him or her. If given the choice, employ-
ees, like employers, would probably choose arbitration over litigation
in the majority of instances.20 2 The difference arises when employees
200. Attorney Robert Fitzpatrick relates workplace disputes to a visit to the doctor. When
a person becomes sick, he must first visit the doctor, describe the problem and then receive the
prescription for medicine. Similarly, an employee should be allowed to discuss the employment
dispute with his or her employee and then agree upon the method of attack to solve the prob-
lem, either through an ADR program or through litigation. See id. at 1299.
201. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
202. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 181, at 1300 (stating that few employees want to go to
court and some would probably prefer mediation or arbitration).
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feel coerced.203 Some employees wish only to end the discriminatory
practices of the employer rather than to seek damages. Post-dispute
arbitration agreements could handle this problem.2°4
Post-dispute agreements may make employees feel more invol-
ved in the process, and managers may be surprised that litigation
claims actually decrease. Courts will likely enforce arbitration
agreements created after the employee brings the claim against the
employer and fully knows the consequences of the arbitration agree-
ment.
Finally, strategic human resources managers should be aware
that compulsory arbitration provisions in preemployment contracts
and CBAs will not necessarily be upheld in courts. Legal precedent
lacks certainty in this area.2 5 Furthermore, congressional action and
public sentiment toward these agreements do not provide much
support for their use.20 6 Rather than asking lawyers to predict future
judicial or legislative action, employers should instead look for the
competitive advantage of keeping a motivated workforce.2 7 From a
legal perspective, lawyers may also want to encourage employers to
change the preemployment mandatory arbitration agreements to
provisions that require the employee to discuss the problem with the
employer before bringing the claim to court. Most courts do not follow
Austin but do distinguish between individual contracts and CBAs.208
Some courts still invalidate the arbitration by finding a lack of
knowing consent.20 9 Moreover, Congress continues to attempt to
adopt legislation that would make these mandatory arbitration
203. "Forcing parties into unfair arbitration procedures ultimately undermines the
valuable things that voluntary ADR can offer in this setting." Dick, supra note 174, at 34
(quoting Mr. Clifford Palefsky, member of the American Arbitration Association's employment
drafting committee).
204. In Almonte, the employee had previously received damages from an arbitration
agreement but the discriminatory conduct continued. Instead of internally filing another
grievance, the employee decided to proceed directly to federal court, but the court, following
Austin, would not allow the employee to bypass the arbitration provisions in the governing CBA.
See Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D. Conn. 1997); see also supra
note 195 (noting that employees gain the same advantages from arbitration whether they decide
to seek this process before or after the claim arises, but they feel more comfortable making the
decision after alleging the discriminatory conduct); supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text
(discussing how legislative history and congressional legislation provides only for post-dispute
arbitration agreements).
205. See supra Parts I and IN.A.
206. See supra Part IV.B.
207. See supra Part IV.C.
208. See supra note 123.
209. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text discussing the decisions in Lai and
Renteria. Although the case does not discuss it, the employee may have been seeking public
disclosure of the discriminatory conduct in belief that this would deter the illegal practices,
since the arbitrator's award had no such effect. See supra note 137.
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agreements null and void.210 Lawyers, thus, should advise their
clients not to use compulsory arbitration clauses but instead to think
about the issue from an SHRM perspective and, if nothing else, to
realize that these agreements are not necessarily enforceable under
current case law.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the adoption of the FAA in 1925 and its liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration to the Supreme Court decisions in
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, to the recent Fourth Circuit decision in
Austin, the enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment agree-
ments continues to create legal problems. The Gilmer decision, the
most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, is now the most
cited and the most followed by lower courts. Yet, the distinctions the
court made in Gilmer between that decision and its decision in
Gardner-Denver seem to be dissolving.21' First, except in the Fourth
Circuit, courts generally apply the FAA to all employment
agreements. 2 2  Second, the Fourth Circuit decision in Austin
eliminated the distinction between CBAs and individual employment
agreements even though the case did not arise under the FAA.213
Thus, the Supreme Court may need to readdress this issue. Until
then, each employee should be treated the same and receive the same
remedies when bringing federal statutory claims. Employers and
lawyers should realize that with an uncertain legal precedent, the
best solution may be found not in the courts, but instead in the
competitive marketplace. To be successful, businesses have adopted
an SHRM perspective in the last decade realizing that their biggest
competitive advantage can be found in their employees. Employers
should realize the benefits of post-dispute voluntary agreements and
210. See supra Part IV.B.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See supra Part IIA.
213. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
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eliminate the coercive and unfair compulsory arbitration agreements
used as boilerplate in employment contracts and handbooks.
John-Paul Motley*
* The Author would like to thank Mr. Keith Covington of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White,
and Professor Thomas Mahoney of the Owen Graduate School of Management for their help
during the writing of this Note. Shannon Pinkston, Greg M unson, Scott Fielding, and Tonya
Gray also provided much assistance with the editing process. Finally, a special thanks to my
parents for their continuing support during my education.
720 [Vol. 51:687
